The three major sources for this article are Who Started WW2? by Udo Walendy (pages 100–110), 1939 – The War That Had Many Fathers by Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof (pages 178–201), and Hitler’s Revolution by Richard Tedor (pages 115–122).
For Hitler, the fate of the Sudetenland represented the tragedy of Germans under foreign rule. During the Reichstag speech on February 20th, 1938, Hitler expressed the situation of the Germans in Czechoslovakia for the first time in public. In this speech, he did not demand an Anschluss; rather, he demanded the right for self-determination as promised in Wilson’s 14 points. He also made a funny snipe against the British:
Just as England sticks up for its own interests over the whole globe, so present-day Germany will know how to stick up for an protect its own—albeit much more limited- interests.
Czechoslovakia was also a potential security threat to Germany that no responsible leader could ignore. Geographically it was a spear point penetrating deep into Reich territory (see map below). On top of that, Germany’s WW2 enemies were being all buddy-buddy with the Czech government.
In January of 1924, Paris and Prague signed a “friendship pact” that contained a military clause for a joint defensive strategy in cause of attack by a common enemy. A formal military treaty was enacted in October of 1925.
In 1935, a few months before he was to become president, Edvard Beneš concluded a military alliance with the Soviet Union. By 1936 the Czechs had created 32 air fields situated near the German frontier for the rapidly expanding Red Air Force. Speaking of Communism, Czechoslovakia was known as a converging point for Communist immigrants that fled Germany in 1933.
Considering these factors, Hitler felt boxed in, but he was undecided on how to recover the Sudetenland. It was no secret that Czechoslovakia’s political situation was untenable and at that time Britain and France were not prepared to go to war with Germany, and why should they?
British diplomat, Basil Newton, sent London a detailed analysis from Prague in March of 1938. Newton was of the opinion that England and France could not prevent Czechoslovakia from being overrun. At best they could wage war to restore a statue quo that was proving to be unworkable. British ambassador Nevile Henderson agreed.
In April of 1938, France’s new prime minister, Eduard Daladier, tried to persuade Neville Chamberlain into publicly guaranteeing English protection for Czechoslovakia—to which Chamberlain retorted that Beneš never treated the German minorities in the liberal manner that he promised. Czechoslovakia had reached hot potato status.
In April of 1938, Hitler ordered a study on the possible invasion of Czechoslovakia, although he did not intend to invade. He would also reject a scenario proposing a “strategic surprise attack out of the clear sky without grounds or possibility of justification.”
In May, Beneš called up over 150,000 military reservists to active duty, claiming that it was necessary because of secret mobilization of German armed forces. The WW1 Allies went along with this allegation even though there was (and still is) no evidence of that claim. This whole incident is now known as the May Crisis.
Western press accepted and repeated Beneš’ reports of German mobilization. When Hitler did not react to Beneš’ provocation, the press spun it as a profound humiliation of a dictator incapable of acting on his own threats. France and Britain responded with military action. France garrisoned their fortifications along the German border, and the UK conducted a partial mobilization of their fleet. Hitler’s decision to not escalate the situation was met with threats and libel.
In the end Beneš played himself. His false accusations against Hitler ultimately led to the Munich Agreement and the eventual downfall of Czechoslovakia. From Wikipedia:
The May Crisis was a short-lived but significant episode in 1938. Although no evidence has emerged of any aggressive German military preparations then being made, the outcome of the crisis was a significant step on the road to the Munich Agreement and the destruction of Czechoslovakia. The identity of the source of the misleading information concerning German troop concentrations that was supplied to the Czechoslovak intelligence service and the precise motivation behind it both remain uncertain.[4]
Continue to part three.